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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: Applica-
tion of the Excessive Entanglements Test in Cases of Public Aid
to Parochial Schools
INTRODUCTION
Direct public aid to the secular functions of sectarian schools can
withstand constitutional scrutiny as long as the procedures required
for administration of the aid program do not foster excessive entangle-
ment between church and state. This conclusion, drawn from the Supreme
Court's recent decisions in Tilton v. Richardson' and Lemon v. Kurtz-
man,2 suggests that the constitutional concept of a "wall of separation
between Church and State"' has undergone substantial change since
1947 when the Court declared in Everson v. Board of Education' that
"[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions .... "' Both the consequences of
that change and the current standards being applied will be explored in
this comment.
A THREE-PRONGED TEST OF "ESTABLISHMENT"
The Court acknowledged in its opinions in Tilton and Lemon that
"the lines of demarcation in . . . [the] extraordinarily sensitive area"
of public aid to parochial schools can be "only dimly [perceived]." '
This statement is particularly relevant to the Court's use of the excessive
entanglements test, first enunciated in Chief Justice Burger's majority
opinion in Walz v. Tax Commission.' Nevertheless, the Tilton and
Lemon decisions have clarified the current focus of the issues considered
when legislation is tested in terms of the first amendment prohibition
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion."
'8
1. 403 U.S. 672 (1971), aff'g Tilton v. Finch, 312 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Conn. 1970).
2. 403 U.S. 602 (1971), rev'g 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969) and affg DiCenso
v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970).
3. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). The Court was quoting
Thomas Jefferson.
4. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
5. Id. at 16.
6. 403 U.S. 602, 612.
7. 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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The Court, after reviewing "the cumulative criteria developed over
many years,"' integrated prior formulations of the establishment test
into a three-pronged checklist:
First, does the Act reflect a secular legislative purpose? Second,
is the primary effect of the Act to advance or inhibit religion?
Third, does the administration of the Act foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion ?1"
In addition to these questions, the Court considered the separate issue
of whether the aid program in question would produce political fragmenta-
tion and conflict on religious grounds."
The manner in which these tests were applied in Tilton and Lemon
indicates that the Court is more concerned with the practical effect of
an aid statute than with the particular form the aid takes and that the
form of the aid is significant not intrinsically, but only in its operative
consequences. While neither of the decisions dealt with the issue of
indirect public assistance to parochial schools through financial aid to
students, 2 as with a voucher plan,' 8 it is suggested that the nature of
the tests applied in Tilton and Lemon affords considerable guidance to
legislatures contemplating enactment of proposals in this area as well as
proposals for other more direct forms of aid to parochial schools.
To provide a substantive foundation for this discussion, the statutes
involved in Tilton and Lemon will be described and the federal district
court decisions upon which the appeals were based will be summarized
briefly. Then the Supreme Court decisions will be analyzed in greater
detail, followed by consideration of potential difficulties which may arise
in further adjudication in this area.
9. 403 U.S. 672, 678.
10. Id.; accord, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13. The first two prongs, frequently referred
to as the "purpose and primary effect" test, were first enunciated by the Court in
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
11. 403 U.S. 672, 688-89; accord, 403 U.S. 602, 622.
12. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Lemon contained the following cryptic
remark: "Whatever might be the result in case of grants to students, it is clear that
once one of the States finances a private school, it is duty bound to make certain
that the school stays within secular bounds and does not use the public funds to promote
sectarian causes." 403 U.S. 602, 632-33 (footnote omitted). Appended to this statement
is the footnote, "Grants to students in the context of the problems of desegregated
public schools have without exception been stricken as tools of the forbidden discrim-
ination." Id. n.17 (citations omitted). It is unclear from this comment whether Justice
Douglas does or does not believe that direct aid to students in the form of vouchers
would withstand constitutional scrutiny, although other statements would seem to
indicate that Justice Douglas is opposed to aid to religious schools in any form. See,
e.g., id. at 640-42.
13. See Note, Education Vouchers-Challenge to the Wall of Separation!, 5
VAL. U.L. REv. 569 (1971).




Federal Construction Grants for Secular Academic Facilities at Institu-
tions of Higher Education
Title I of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 196314 authorizes
grants for construction of academic facilities at institutions of higher
education. The Act specifically provides that no funds will be granted
for buildings used for sectarian instruction or worship or for any
facilities "to be used primarily in connection with any part of the program
of a school or department of divinity."
In Tilton v. Finch,"6 taxpayers brought suit in federal district court
against the officials charged with administering the aid program and
against four church-related colleges and universities" which had received
grants under the program for construction of two libraries, a music-
drama-arts center, a physical science building and a modern foreign
language laboratory.' Plaintiffs alleged that the Act did not authorize
grants to the named schools, or, in the alternative, that if the grants
were authorized, the Act violated the establishment and free exercise
clauses of the first amendment. 9 The three-judge district court deter-
mined that the particular grants in question were in fact authorized by the
Act. The court further found, however, that since the Act had a secular
purpose and its regulatory provisions successfully limited the grants to
secular as opposed to religious functions, the grants did not constitute
aid to religion in violation of either the establishment or free exercise
clause."
State Purchase of Secular Educational Services from Non-Public Schools
The Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education
Act2' authorizes reimbursement to non-public schools for the actual cost
of teachers' salaries, textbooks and instructional materials for courses in
mathematics, modern foreign languages, physical sciences and physical
education. The courses must be without religious content and similar
to parallel courses in the public schools. Moreover, the books and
materials used must have state approval, students taking the courses
14. 20 U.S.C. §§ 701-58 (1964).
15. Id. § 751(a) (2).
16. 312 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Conn. 1970), aff'd, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
17. The schools were Sacred Heart University, Annhurst College, Fairfield
University and Albertus Magnus College, all located in Connecticut.
18. 312 F. Supp. at 1203-04.
19. Id. at 1194.
20. Id. at 1200.
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (Supp. 1971).
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must perform satisfactorily on standardized state examinations on the
subjects funded and, within five years of the statute's enactment, all
teachers whose salaries are reimbursed to the school must have achieved
state certification.22 Schools intending to request reimbursement must
maintain separate accounts of their expenditures for the sanctioned
secular courses, to be subject to state audit."S
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,24 suit was instituted in federal district
court against the state officials administering the Pennsylvania statute
and against several parochial schools seeking reimbursement under the
Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the program violated the establishment
and free exercise clauses of the first amendment. The defendants moved
for dismissal for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.25 Though finding that one plaintiff did
have standing to contest the constitutionality of the Act," the court, in a
two to one decision, granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state a
proper claim. The court determined that the state, in pursuance of a
public purpose and with appropriate administrative regulations, could
give direct aid to the secular function of a parochial school without
breaching the establishment prohibition.28 Chief Circuit Judge Hastie
filed a vigorous dissent, arguing essentially that despite the public purpose
of the program, any aid to a religious school necessarily resulted in
direct support of the school's religious enterprise. This effect could not
be avoided or justified by the simultaneous benefit accruing to the
state."5 He also noted with dismay the diminishment of the school's
freedom resulting from the administrative intrusion of the state."0
State Salary Supplements to Teachers of Secular Subjects in Non-Public
Schools
The Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act of 196981 undertakes
"to assist non-public schools to provide salary scales which will enable
them to retain and obtain teaching personnel who meet recognized
22. Id. §§ 5603-04. However, the requirement for certification within five years
was waived for individuals who were full time teachers in non-public schools at the
time the statute was enacted. Id. § 5604. The Act also established a ceiling formula
to determine the total to which any school could be reimbursed. Id. § 5607(b.1).
23. Id. § 5607(a).
24. 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969), rev'd 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
25. Id. at 38.
26. Id. at 41-42.
27. Id. at 49.
28. Id. at 46.
29. Id. at 50-51.
30. Id. at 52.
31. R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. §§ 16-51-1 to -9 (Supp. 1970).
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standards of quality.""2 Specifically, the Act authorizes supplemental
payments made directly to teachers in grades one through eight of up to
15 percent of the teachers' annual salaries in order to bring their salaries
up to the public school level. The average per pupil expenditures for
secular subjects at schools whose teachers are eligible for supplements
must not exceed the public school average. 3 Eligible teachers are required
to have a state teaching certificate and must teach only those subjects
offered in the public schools, using public school materials. 4 The Act
includes administrative procedures to insure that the eligibility require-
ments are enforced. 5
Citizens and taxpayers of Rhode Island brought suit in federal
district court in DiCenso v. Robinson"s against state officials responsible
for administering the Salary Supplement Act, alleging that the Act
violated the establishment and free exercise clauses because "its purpose
and primary effect [was] the advancement of religion." 7 The three-
judge court, relying upon Walz v. Tax Commission" which had been
decided the previous month by the Supreme Court, found that the effect
of the Act was to involve the state and the religious schools in "the kind
of reciprocal embroilments . . .which the First Amendment was meant
to avoid"89 and that the Act was therefore unconstitutional."
APPLICATION OF THE ExCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT TEST
The district courts' actions dismissing Lemon and holding the Rhode
Island statute unconstitutional in DiCenso were appealed to the Supreme
Court and were there consolidated. The Tilton decision upholding the
constitutionality of federal construction grants was also appealed. The
actions were considered by the Court at the same time; the opinions on
appeal, Lemon v. Kurtzman and Tilton v. Richardson, were announced
on June 28, 1971.
Six separate opinions were filed in the two cases. The Court
plurality opinion in each case was written by Chief Justice Burger.
32. Id. § 16-51-1.
33. Id. § 16-51-2.
34. Id. § 16-51-3.
35. Id. § 16-51-5.
36. 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I 1970), affd sub nom. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971).
37. Id. at 113.
38. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
39. 316 F. Supp. at 122.
40. Id. District Judge Pettine concurred in the result and in the finding that the
program resulted in proscribed "reciprocal embroilments," but dissented in a second
finding of the majority that the Act gave "substantial support for a religious enterprise."
1972]
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Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion in Lemon in which Justice
Black joined, and Justice Marshall joined as to the Rhode Island case.
Justice Douglas also filed a dissent in Tilton in which he was joined
by Justices Black and Marshall. Justice Marshall took no part in con-
sideration of the Pennsylvania case. Justices Brennan and White each
wrote separate opinions incorporating all three cases."
Essentially, the various opinions in Tilton and Lemon can be sum-
marized in four points. First, the Court upheld federal grants for con-
struction of higher education facilities42 but declared that both state
statutes were unconstitutional.43 Secondly, the Court plurality based its
analysis in both cases upon the Wals excessive entanglements language
relied upon by the DiCenso courte4 and foreshadowed by Chief Judge
Hastie's dissent in the district court's decision in Lemon. 5 Thirdly,
neither Justice Brennan nor Justice White could discern a credible
distinction between the state and federal statutes which would support
the plurality's finding that excessive entanglements would result from
the state statutes but not from the federal statute.4 Finally, a minority
of the Court (Justices Douglas, Black, Marshall and Brennan) main-
tained the strict doctrinal position voiced in Chief Judge Hastie's Lemon
dissent 7 that public aid to the secular activities of sectarian schools
necessarily supports the religious functions of those schools and is
therefore unconstitutional.48
The Court plurality, speaking through Chief Justice Burger, based
its decisions upon the conclusion that the state programs would involve
excessive entanglement between church and state, whereas the federal
program would not. Chief Justice Burger distinguished the federal
program from the state programs in the Tilton opinion, examining in
each instance the fundamental purpose of the institution funded, the
object of the funding and the resulting relationship between the institution
and the government.
41. 403 U.S. 602, 642-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting in Tilton v. Richardson and
concurring in Lemon Iv. Kurtzman); 403 U.S. 602, 661-71 (White, J., concurring
in Tilton v. Richardson and concurring in result in Pennsylvania case and dissenting in
Rhode Island case in Lemon v. Kurtzman).
42. 403 U.S. 672, 689. A section of the federal statute provided that the religious
use restrictions would apply only during the first twenty years of the life of a funded
building. 20 U.S.C. § 754(b) (1964). The Court ruled that this provision would
advance religion, but invalidated only that portion of the statute. 403 U.S. 672, 683-84.
43. 403 U.S. 602, 607.
44. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
45. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
46. 403 U.S. 642, 660-61; 403 U.S. 661, 668.
47. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
48. 403 U.S. 602, 625-42; 403 U.S. 672, 689-97.
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The Fundamental Purpose of the Institutions Funded
Chief Justice Burger distinguished the nature of parochial primary
and secondary schools from that of sectarian colleges and universities on
the ground that "[t]here are generally significant differences between
the religious aspects""9 of the two types of schools. On the one hand, as
the district court had found in DiCenso, parochial primary and secondary
schools were "an integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic
Church."5 The Chief Justice found full support in the DiCenso record
for the district court's "conclusion that the inculcation of religious values
was a substantial if not the dominant purpose of the institutions."'" On
the other hand, the colleges and universities named in the Tilton com-
plaint were "institutions with admittedly religious functions but whose
predominant higher education mission is to provide their students with a
secular education."5 The basis for this distinction, as well as analysis
of the Chief Justice's treatment of this aspect of the problem, will be
discussed at length in a later section of this comment.5" It is mentioned
here in the first instance because Chief Justice Burger relied upon the
distinction as one basis for his conclusion that excessive entanglement
would not result from the federal program. He argued that since the
fundamental purpose of the colleges was secular rather than religious,
there was "less likelihood than in primary and secondary schools that
religion [would] permeate the area of secular education."' 4 Corres-
pondingly, there was less risk that government aid to secular functions
of a college would in fact support religious training. In turn, this
resulted in less need for extensive administrative surveillance and hence
less likelihood that the aid program would entail excessive entanglement
of church and state. 5
The Object of the Funding
Chief Justice Burger also argued that the degree of entanglement
fostered by the three programs could be distinguished because of the
differences in what was funded under the program.
In Lemon and DiCenso . . . the state programs subsidized
teachers, either directly or indirectly. Since teachers are not
49. 403 U.S. 672, 685.
50. 316 F. Supp. at 117.
51. 403 U.S. 672, 685.
52. Id. at 687.
53. See notes 80-100 infra and accompanying text.
54. 403 U.S. 672, 687.
55. Id.
1972] 219
et al.: Constitutional Law—Separation of Church and State: Application of
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1972
220 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
necessarily religiously neutral, greater governmental surveillance
would be required to guarantee that state salary aid would not
in fact subsidize religious instruction. There we found the
resulting entanglement excessive. . . . [In Tilton,] on the
other hand, [with federal aid for construction of college
buildings] the government provides facilities that are them-
selves religiously neutral. The risks of government aid to
religion and the corresponding need for surveillance are there-
fore reduced."
Justice Brennan considered this distinction and found it unconvinc-
ing. He argued that it was not a "non-ideological" building but teachers
and course content which would have to be policed under the federal
program, and that the policing was therefore "precisely the same as
under the state statutes." 7 Justice Douglas agreed with Justice Brennan,
wondering how the Government could determine what was being taught
within the walls of the "neutral" building "without a continuous auditing
of classroom instruction.""8 One answer to Justice Douglas' question
may be the nature of the particular buildings financed: one could argue
that there is less likelihood that religious content will creep into college
courses held in physical science buildings and modern language labora-
tories than in general-purpose classroom buildings. A second answer
to his question can be found in a footnote to Justice Brennan's opinion.
The footnote indicates that the Office of Higher Education stipulated
in district court that on-site review of completed projects included
analysis of "class schedules and course descriptions contained in the
school catalog . . . to ascertain that nothing in the nature of sectarian
instruction is scheduled in any area constructed with the use of Federal
funds."5 Although one might question the effectiveness of this method
of review, it is nevertheless apparent that as far as entanglement is
concerned, perusal of college catalogs is far less objectionable than the
in-class surveillance which the Chief Justice seemed to believe was
required under the state plans.
Though Chief Justice Burger concluded that surveillance was neces-
sary to administer the state programs, neither the Pennsylvania nor the
Rhode Island statute, by its terms, calls for such a measure. The Pennsyl-
vania Act forbids reimbursement of expenses for courses "expressing
56. Id. at 687-88.
57. 403 U.S. 602, 661.
58. 403 U.S. 672, 694.
59. 403 U.S. 602, 650-51 rL9.
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religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of any sect.""'
However, the administrative procedures of the Act indicate that the
Pennsylvania legislature was assured that the restriction could be enforced
simply by limiting the kinds of courses for which reimbursement was
authorized. The Act therefore applies only to those courses in "mathe-
matics, modern foreign languages, physical science and physical educa-
tion" which used textbooks and materials approved by the state Secretary
of Education." The Rhode Island legislature, on the other hand, chose
to guarantee that state aid would not go to support religious teaching by
requiring, and then relying upon, the signed pledges of teachers receiving
salary supplements that they did not teach religious courses or inject
religion into their nominally secular courses.8 On the face of things, it
would seem that these state controls are no more entangling in a sub-
stantive sense than the controls employed in the federal statute.
Justice White studied the argument made by the Chief Justice
distinguishing the state from the federal programs and concluded that
the reasoning was "a curious and mystifying blend, but a critical factor
appears to be an unwillingness to accept the District Court's express
findings [in the Rhode Island case] that on the evidence before it none
of the teachers . . . [receiving salary supplements] mixed religious
and secular instruction."'" He commented further: "Nor can I imagine
. . . [on what basis the Court finds] college clerics more reliable in
keeping promises than their counterparts in elementary and secondary
schools .. .64
In fairness to the Chief Justice and the other members of the
plurality, it should be noted that Justice White apparently failed to
recognize the crux of their argument. In discussing the Rhode Island
statute, Chief Justice Burger made it very clear that he did not question
the good faith of the teachers in making their pledges and that he did not
necessarily believe it was impossible for a teacher to keep religious
teaching from intruding into a secular course. What was controlling in
the situation was that the essential proselytizing mission of religious
primary and secondary schools had two necessary effects on the operation
of the state aid programs. First, it would be very difficult for teachers to
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5603 (Supp. 1971).
61. Id. § 5604. State approval of textbooks for use in parochial schools had
passed the test of constitutionality previously. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968).
62. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 16-51-3 (Supp. 1970).
63. 403 U.S. 602, 666.
64. Id. at 668.
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separate religious teaching from secular courses, and second, to preserve
the aid program it would be necessary for the state to engage in
intimate supervision of the program in operation. The Chief Justice
stated :
The Rhode Island legislature has not, and could not, provide
state aid on the basis of a mere assumption that secular teachers
under religious discipline can avoid conflicts. The State must
be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers
do not inculcate religion .... 65
He went on in his discussion of the Pennsylvania statute to indicate that
under that program, too, as long as aid was given, the possibility existed
that the aid might go to support religious teaching.6 In essence, then,
he argued that a state could not discharge its constitutional obligation
simply by adhering to the letter of the administrative controls specifically
provided in the statutes. The nature of the goals of the statutes necessarily
compelled the state to supervise the execution of the administrative
controls themselves. In so doing, however, the state would become
excessively entangled with the religious school. Both state aid programs
thus were caught between the Scylla of giving aid to a religious enterprise
and the Charybdis of excessive entanglement.
The Resulting Relationship Between the Funded Institution and the State
Chief Justice Burger pointed to a third factor which reduced the
likelihood of excessive entanglement under the federal program. The
federal aid was "a one-time, single-purpose construction grant" 7 with
"no continuing financial relationships or dependencies, no annual audits,
and no government analysis of an institution's expenditures on secular
as distinguished from religious activities,"6 as the state programs
required.
Justice White found that this distinction had little factual basis. He
noted that the need for state entanglement in the financial affairs of the
schools was considerably less in practical application, at least in the case
of Rhode Island, than the Chief Justice feared in potential. 9 The Rhode
Island plan required separate accounts of expenditures for secular and
65. Id. at 619 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 620-21.
67. 403 U.S. 672, 688.
68. Id.
69. 403 U.S. 602, 668-69. But see Note, Sectarian Books, the Supreme Court and
the Establishment Clause, 79 YALE L.J. 111 (1969).
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religious instruction only when the parochial school's average per pupil
expenditures exceeded those of the public schools.7" Because the parochial
per pupil expenditures reflected the lower salary level of teaching sisters
(which was one-third the salary of public school teachers), none of the
parochial schools whose lay teachers were receiving salary supplements
had been required to maintain separate accounts. 7 As long as this was
the case, Justice White's criticism is well taken: furnishing the state
with annual per pupil expenditure figures seems no more entangling
than providing course descriptions, which the Chief Justice apparently
considered innocuous.
Two other arguments were made attacking this distinction. Justice
White pointed out the fallacy of concluding that the "one-time" grant
involved no continuing relationship: "It is apparent that federal interest
in any grant will be a continuing one since the conditions attached to the
grant must be enforced." 7 Justice Douglas compared the annual state
grants to the one-time federal grant and called it "sophistry" to argue
that "small violations of the First Amendment over a period of years are
unconstitutional . . . while a huge violation occurring only once is
de minimus.' "
Distinguishing the federal plan from the state plans on the basis that
the federal plan would not result in a continuing relationship between
the school and the government seems to be the weakest of Chief Justice
Burger's "excessive entanglement" arguments. However, he admitted
that none of the three factors alone was sufficient in itself to uphold the
federal plan but concluded that
cumulatively all of [the factors] shape a narrow and limited
relationship with government which involves fewer and less
significant contacts than the two state schemes before [the
Court] in Lemon and DiCenso. The relationship therefore
has less potential for realizing the substantive evils against
which the Religion Clauses were intended to protect."'
The Potential for Political Divisiveness
Turning from the issue of excessive entanglement, Chief Justice
70. 403 U.S. 602, 607-08 & n.2, construing R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-51-2
(Supp. 1970).
71. DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 115 & n.6 (D.R.I. 1970).
72. 403 U.S. 602, 669.
73. 403 U.S. 672, 693.
74. Id. at 688.
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Burger distinguished the state programs from the federal program on
one other ground: the potential for political divisiveness. The Chief
Justice considered this factor at some length in his Lemon opinion. He
pointed to the "monumental and deepening financial crisis"7 faced by
parochial schools and to the fact that, though the state statutes, by their
terms, did not single out for aid the schools of any particular religious
affiliation, in practical effect the issue was reduced to aid to "relatively
few religious groups."78 Because of the projected continuing need for
aid, "state assistance [would] entail considerable political activity"7
and would produce "political fragmentation and divisiveness on religious
lines."7 ' On the other hand, Chief Justice Burger felt that "[tlhe
potential for divisiveness inherent in the essentially local problems of
primary and secondary schools is significantly less with respect to a
college or university whose student constituency is not local but diverse
and widely dispersed."7 "
None of the other Justices took issue with this argument, and the
distinction, though undocumented, seems reasonable. However, the
weight of this argument standing alone is probably insufficient to uphold
the federal aid program. With regard to the state programs, Chief Justice
Burger proffered the issue of political divisiveness simply as a policy
consideration providing additional, but not essential, support for holding
the two state statutes unconstitutional.
UNDERLYING BASES OF THE COURT'S ARGUMENTS
Despite Chief Justice Burger's concentration upon the Walz "exces-
sive entanglements" language, analysis of all of the opinions filed in
Lemon and Tilton indicates that two more fundamental issues underlie
the arguments made by members of the Court. First of all, different
factual assumptions about the nature of sectarian higher education pro-
duced different conclusions regarding the constitutionality of federal
construction grants. Secondly, members of the Court propounded dif-
ferent philosophical positions concerning whether it is possible and con-
stitutional to aid only the secular functions of religious schools.
75. 403 U.S. 602, 623, quoting DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 116 (D.R.I.
1970). However, some critics of state aid programs dispute the conclusion that this
"financial crisis" works to the ultimate detriment of parochial schools. See 403 U.S.
672, 695-96 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Swomley, Are Parochial Schools Imperiled?, 66
LIBERTY, Sept.-Oct., 1971, at 10.
76. 403 U.S. 602, 623.
77. Id. at 622.
78. Id. at 623.
79. 403 U.S. 672, 688-89.
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The Nature of Sectarian Higher Education
As previously mentioned," Chief Justice Burger found that the
"predominant higher education mission" of the colleges named in the
Tilton complaint was "to provide their students with a secular educa-
tion."'" This distinguished the colleges from parochial primary and
secondary schools whose fundamental purpose was to indoctrinate young
people in a religious faith "to assure future adherents to a particular faith
by having control of their total education at an early age."82 Chief
Justice Burger pointed to three features of the sectarian college experience
which lessened the likelihood that formal instruction in a college could
or would serve as a vehicle for religious indoctrination. First, he voiced
the "common observation"8 that college students are endowed with a
characteristic skepticism which renders them less susceptible to indoc-
trination of any kind. Secondly, he argued that formal instruction in
colleges and universities is confined within the internal constraints of
separate scholarly disciplines, and that this tends to reduce the oppor-
tunity to inject religious training into secular courses. Finally, he noted
the "high degree of academic freedom" characterizing "many church-
related colleges and universities."8" This last observation presumably
was intended to suggest that despite the religious affiliation of these
schools, their administrators and teachers have little desire to engage
in indoctrination of any kind. Examining the Tilton record, Chief Justice
Burger found no allegation or evidence that the colleges and universities
named in the complaint did not follow the general pattern he had
described.8
The effect of Justice Douglas' treatment of this problem was to
discard as extraneous Chief Justice Burger's argument that the funda-
mental purpose of church-related colleges and universities is secular.
According to Justice Douglas, "[p]arochial schools are not beamed at
agnostics, atheists, or those of a competing sect. The more sophisticated
institutions may admit minorities; but the dominant religious character
is not changed."8 Underpinning all of Justice Douglas' arguments was
the belief that as long as a college maintains religious sponsorship,
80. See notes 49-52 &upra nd accompanying text.
81. 403 U.S. 672, 687.
82. Id. at 685-86, quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 644, 671 (1970).
83. 403 U.S. 672, 686.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 692 (emphasis added).
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secular instruction is provided within a broader framework which is
permeated by religious values giving order and direction to the day-to-
day activities of its students.
Justice Brennan and Justice White, reviewing the arguments of
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Douglas, agreed with each other that
one of those arguments was based upon presumption rather than proof.
However, they could not agree upon which of those arguments was
faulty. Justice Brennan, who concurred with the plurality's decision
that the state statutes were unconstitutional, would have held the federal
statute unconstitutional insofar as it purported to authorize aid to sectarian
institutions. Justice Brennan, however, apparently was unwilling to as-
sume with Justice Douglas that every church-related college has a
"dominant religious character," and therefore would have remanded
Tilton for consideration of whether the four colleges named in the
complaint were in fact "sectarian" schools."
Justice White took the opposite approach and would have held all
three statutes constitutional."8 He criticized Chidf Justice Burger's
plurality opinion in Lemon for striking down the Rhode Island statute
primarily on [the plurality's] own model and its own supposi-
tions and unsupported views of what is likely to happen in
Rhode Island parochial school classrooms, although on this
record there is no indication that entanglement difficulties will
accompany the salary supplement program. 9
Apparently Justice White did not assign the same importance as
the Chief Justice did to the district court's finding that the Rhode
Island schools were "an integral part of the religious mission of the
Catholic Church."9 In addition, Justice White disagreed with the Chief
Justice's prediction that excessive entanglements would necessarily arise.9'
Whether or not Justice White's evaluation of the district court's factual
findings is correct, at least to the extent that theoretically necessary
consequences fail to correspond to real consequences, Justice White's
criticism may be justified.
Neither would Justice White have substituted "presumption for
87. 403 U.S. 602, 661.
88. 403 U.S. 602, 665, 671.
89. Id. at 668.
90. DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 117 (D.R.I. 1970). The Chief Justice's
treatment of this factual finding is at 403 U.S. 602, 616. Justice White's argument is
found id. at 666-67.
91. 403 U.S. 602, 666-69.
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proof"9 in the Pennsylvania case, which came before the Court on
appeal by opponents of the statute from a dismissal for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. Justice White agreed that
the complaint should not have been dismissed, but would have remanded
the case for trial to determine whether religious content did in fact enter
into courses for which state aid was given 5 He pointed out that in the
Pennsylvania case, the relationship between the church and the religious
schools had only been alleged in the complaint. While the Court had to
accept the allegations as true for the purposes of review,"' Justice White
believed that the plurality had gone beyond the scope of review to find
the statute unconstitutional on the basis of allegations rather than findings
of fact.95 This portion of Justice White's argument seems to be well-
founded. If the constitutionality of the statute is dependent upon the
degree of entanglement which will arise, and the entanglement is predicted
from the nature of the school and its relationship to the church, then it
seems improper to declare summarily that the statute is unconstitutional
when the nature of the school in relation to the church has only been
alleged and has not been determined by a full trial of the facts."
A similar criticism can be applied fruitfully to Chief Justice Burger's
conclusions about the nature of sectarian higher education. Unlike the
two state cases, in Tilton the Court was not presented with district
court findings or by pleadings establishing the nature of the colleges
receiving federal grants."7 Chief Justice Burger's conclusions were his
own, though documented by scholarly studies on parochial education."
92. Id. at 668.
93. Id. at 670-71.
94. 403 U.S. 672, 685.
95. 403 U.S. 602, 670-71.
96. This argument seems valid even though Chief Justice Burger did not rely
entirely upon the excessive entanglement argument to find the Pennsylvania statute
unconstitutional. While the Chief Justice pointed out that the Pennsylvania program
had "the further defect of providing state financial aid directly to the church-related
school," 403 U.S. 602, 621, his opinion gave no indication that the direct-aid argument
was controlling or even that it had particular significance apart from his conclusion that
the program would produce excessive entanglements. This view of the importance of
the direct-aid argument gains additional credibility from consideration of the fact that
the federal program for construction grants, which was upheld, was also a direct-aid
program.
97. 403 U.S. 672, 685.
98. Chief Justice Burger footnoted his conclusions with the following studies:
J. FICHTER, PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY (1958); M. PATTILLO & D.
MACKENZIE, CHURCH-SPONSORED HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1966);
Freund, Comment: Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680 (1969);
Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishsnent, and Doctrinal Development, 81 HARV.
L. REv. 513 (1968).
19721
et al.: Constitutional Law—Separation of Church and State: Application of
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1972
228 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
However, it is not clear from his opinion whether the foundation for
those conclusions was tested before the Court. If Chief Justice Burger
took unofficial judicial notice of the studies which he cited, or if the
Court heard arguments supporting only one side of the question, then
the Chief Justice's conclusions about the nature of church-related colleges
can be criticized for being based on "presumption rather than proof."
Justice Douglas' position that parochial education at all levels is
permeated by religious values is subject to criticism of the same kind. In
the first place, the scholarly sources cited by Justice Douglas speak in
general terms about the parochial education of children, which suggests
that the conclusions of those sources were not intended to refer to
college education. Furthermore, Justice Douglas, in the face of the
distinction drawn by the plurality between parochial pre-college and
college education, did not provide documentation for his contention that
church-related colleges are as much a part of the religious mission of the
church as are primary and secondary schools, and that all church-related
schools regardless of level engage in the same kind of religious in-
doctrination."'
In light of these criticisms of both Chief Justice Burger's plurality
approach and Justice Douglas' minority position, Justice Brennan's
"middle ground" approach might seem most sensible: that the con-
stitutionality of an aid statute, as applied, is dependent upon a deter-
mination in any given case that the degree to which religious values
permeate all aspects of instruction is insufficient to classify the school
as "sectarian." However, this approach only produces another problem.
If the propriety of public aid is dependent upon the degree to which the
church involved declares religious values ought to be part of a child's
total education, then it follows that public aid will be granted or denied
on the basis of distinctions in religious beliefs. Rather than serving to
insure the constitutionality of public aid, Justice Brennan's approach
would discriminate against the very religious in favor of the not-so-
religious."'
The Philosophical Argument: Severability of Secular and Religious
Functions in Church-Related Schools
Both Justice Brennan and Justice Douglas argued essentially that
99. See 403 U.S. 602, 635 n.20; 403 U.S. 672, 692 n.2.
100. 403 U.S. 672, 693-95.
101. See Drinan, Does State Aid to Church-Related Colleges Constitute an
Establishment of Religion? -Reflections on the Maryland College Cases, 1967 UTAH
L. REv. 491, 503-04; Giannella, supra note 98, at 588-89.
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any aid given to a parochial school necessarily assists the school in
fulfilling its religious functions. According to their view, "a parochial
school is a unitary institution with subtle blending of sectarian and
secular instruction,"1 2 and aid to the institution is per se unconstitutional
since it serves to benefit the sectarian as well as the secular.
Chief Justice Burger rejected this "unitary" view, which had been
argued by the appellants in Tilton,' and turned to a less "simplistic"'" 4
analysis of whether the secular and sectarian functions of a school are
severable.'"" In both Lemon and Tilton the plurality found that, in
general, religious teaching is not necessarily inextricably intertwined
with secular instruction."0 6 The Chief Justice pointed to administrative
procedures contained in all of the statutes under consideration which
were intended to insure that the aid provided would support only secular
functions-procedures which were based upon the legislative assumption
that severability was in fact possible. °7
Justice Brennan believed that the Chief Justice's treatment of the
problem was too limited in scope. Speaking of the Chief Justice's Tilton
opinion, he argued:
The plurality would examine only the activities that occur
within the federally assisted building and ignore the religious
nature of the school of which it is a part. The "religious
enterprise" aided by the construction grants involves the main-
tenance of an educational environment-which includes high-
quality, purely secular educational courses-within which
religious instruction occurs in a variety of ways.'
The essential issue involved in this argument is whether analysis
in terms of "severability" diverts attention from a more fundamental
consideration, the second prong of the plurality's test of establishment:
whether the primary effect of the aid is to support a religious enterprise.
The opportunity to illuminate this complex area was clearly before the
Court in Lemon and Tilton. The Lemon district court majority had
based its decision upholding the Pennsylvania statute upon the existence
102. 403 U.S. 672, 694 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 680.
104. Id. at 679.
105. Id. at 680-81.
106. Id. at 681-82; 403 U.S. 602, 613.
107. 403 U.S. 602, 613, 616; 403 U.S. 672, 679.
108. 403 U.S. 602, 660.
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of severability,0 9 while the district court dissent argued in "unitary"
terms." The DiCenso district court described at some length the
difficulty of applying the "primary effect" test. That court very realistical-
ly noted that the Rhode Island statute had
two significant effects: on the one hand, it aids the quality
of secular education; on the other, it provides support to a
religious enterprise. Judicial efforts to decide which of these
effects is "the primary effect" . . . are likely to be no more
satisfactory than efforts to rank the legs of a table in order
of importance."1
The DiCenso court thereupon dispensed with efforts to find which effect
was the more important by interpreting the "primary effect" test to
require only "substantial support for a religious enterprise" which would
entail "the kind of reciprocal embroilments of government and religion
which the First Amendment was meant to avoid.""' 2
Rather than seizing the opportunity to clarify the significance of
the "primary effect" test, Chief Justice Burger affirmed the viability of
the test but effectively side-stepped the problem. In the Tilton opinion,
he gave consideration to the issue, but solved the problem conveniently
by finding that since the fundamental purpose of the colleges was not
religious but secular, the principal effect of the construction grants must
be secular as well."' In Lemon, Chief Justice Burger avoided the issue
entirely, declaring that it was not necessary to consider the question of
primary effect since there was sufficient reason to declare the state statutes
unconstitutional on the basis of excessive entanglements alone."'
It is suggested that this treatment of the "primary effect" portion
of the test is very unsatisfying. The argument is very plausible that
whether or not secular functions of parochial schools can be separated
from religious training, aid to a parochial school's secular functions
ultimately serves to assist whatever religious goals the school promotes-
whether by making private funds formerly spent on secular activities
available for religious functions or by enhancing the church school's
capacity to retain or add to its student body. This surely is provision of
"substantial support" to a church-related institution, and in view of the
109. 310 F. Supp. at 46.
110. Id. at 50-51.
111. 316 F. Supp. at 119.
112. Id. at 122 (emphasis added).
113. 403 U.S. 672, 679-82.
114. 403 U.S. 602, 613-14.
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Court's historical concern with the issue of state aid to religion, it seems
inappropriate for the Court plurality to fail to deal squarely with the
issue in these cases.
While this sin of omission may cause the proponents of separation
of church and state to dismay, the plurality's treatment of another aspect
of the problem may provide a ray of hope. Two types of aid programs
were involved in Tilton and Lemon: direct assistance to the church-
related school through construction grants and reimbursement for secular
educational services and indirect assistance through salary supplements
to parochial school teachers. The Chief Justice considered the direct-
indirect distinction significant not in itself, but for the resulting entangle-
ment involved in administration of a program." 5 It is suggested that
voucher plans, tax credits and other proposals for indirect aid to parochial
schools will be subject to careful constitutional scrutiny regarding their
operational consequences. It is further suggested that as long as parochial
primary and secondary schools have religious goals, any assistance pro-
gram which provides public funds to such schools, whether directly or
through an intermediary, will necessarily require stringent administra-
tive procedures to insure that public funds support only secular instruc-
tion. Judging from the Court's treatment of the Rhode Island and
Pennsylvania statutes, it will be difficult to invent procedures which will
not be deemed to cause excessive entanglement between church and state.
CONCLUSION
By drawing together elements from previous tests of establishment
into a cohesive checklist, the Lemon and Tilton plurality opinions have
clarified the present law regarding aid to parochial schools. However, it is
apparent from analysis of the Court's internal arguments in the two cases
that the excessive entanglements test is quite subjective. Furthermore,
the full impact of the combined test has yet to be shown since the question
of primary effect was not fully considered. In addition, the fact that
several members of the Court continued to support the strict doctrine
that aid to parochial schools in any form supports the religious goals of
the schools indicates that constitutional debate over this philosophical
issue will continue.
A final question of perhaps the most profound potential significance
remains unanswered. This problem was summarized by the DiCenso
district court:
115. Id. at 616-17, 621.
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Private conduct which is heavily subsidized by the state may
be viewed as state action and subjected to the same standards
of impartiality which we demand of the government. Apply-
ing these standards to parochial schools might well restrict
their ability to discriminate in admissions policies, and in the
hiring and firing of teachers. At some point the school be-
comes "public" for more purposes than the Church could
wish. At that point, the Church may justifiably feel that its
victory on the Establishment Clause has meant abandonment
of the Free Exercise Clause."'
116. 316 F. Supp. at 121-22 (footnotes omitted).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 [1972], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol6/iss2/6
